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The President, the Environment, and Foreign Policy: 
The Globalization of Environmental Politics 
 
David A. Wirth* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 By comparison with domestic environmental issues, international 
environmental diplomacy is distinguished by one overarching attribute: the far 
greater role of the executive branch, and in particular the presidency. Although 
Congress is far from irrelevant in the international sphere and can exercise 
considerable leverage at certain important junctures, as a general matter there 
is a commensurate decrease in the importance of domestic legislative activity 
in international environmental law and politics. Further, the role of the courts 
is often attenuated, meaning that the president plays a far more expansive role 
than anticipated by the Constitution's mandate to “take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.”1 Accordingly, the institutional dynamics in international 
environmental policy-making are very different from their domestic analogues. 
 From the point of view of the environment, this heightened emphasis on 
executive branch discretion is something of a two-edged sword. A president 
with a proactive commitment to progress on environmental issues is in a 
position to accomplish a great deal through his unilateral initiative on behalf 
of the United States when tied to reciprocal commitments from other 
governments. Conversely, there is little that other branches of the federal 
government can do to motivate an unenthusiastic or lethargic chief executive.  
 Both of these Janus-like faces of presidential power were represented in 
the negotiation of the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the 
Ozone Layer,2 which is widely regarded as one of the most effective 
instruments to result from international environmental diplomacy. Initially, the 
executive branch was aggressive in advocating deep cuts in production and 
consumption of compounds that deplete ozone in the stratosphere. At a crucial 
moment, however, the Reagan administration appeared prepared to do an 
about-face; Secretary of the Interior, Donald Hodel, questioned the need for a 
regulatory intervention, advocating instead that individuals protect themselves 
from elevated ultraviolet radiation by making use of hats, sunglasses, and 
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sunscreen.3 This provided an opportunity for some memorable quips from a 
former colleague, who described Hodel’s proposal as the “Ray Ban Plan,” and 
asked the rhetorical question, “What does Secretary Hodel want, an entire 
country that looks like the Blues Brothers?” The political cartoonist for the 
Washington Post also had a field day, producing a classic contribution 
depicting fish, birds, animals, trees, and crops, all wearing hats and 
sunglasses.4  
This article addresses the complexity of this duality in presidential power 
as manifested by two more recent examples. The first, dealing with climate 
change from an international perspective, suggests the limits to presidential 
power as applied in the service of an environmental protection agenda. The 
second, treating the issue of trade and environment, illustrates the extent to 
which the presidential prerogative in foreign relations can be employed to 
compromise environmental objectives.  
 
II. CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
On the multilateral level, the history of the climate change issue for the 
past decade or so has been one of partially realized potential for overcoming 
impediments to collective international action. The situation in the United 
States, which accounts for about a quarter of all greenhouse gas emissions, 
demonstrates the important role of the presidency in furthering or impeding 
international action to protect the global environment. 
Formal international cooperation to protect the global climate 
commenced in 1992 with the adoption of the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (Convention or FCCC),5 negotiated for the United States by 
the first Bush administration and adopted at the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development. During negotiations on the Convention, there 
was considerable debate as to whether that instrument should contain 
substantive emissions limitations for greenhouse gases or, alternatively, should 
serve only as a procedural framework for future cooperation on the climate 
problem.6 In the end, the drafters fashioned a compromise of constructive 
ambiguity, adopting a goal of limiting greenhouse gas emissions from 
industrialized countries to their 1990 levels, which could be (and has been) 
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interpreted by some as mandatory and binding, and by others as “soft” or 
advisory only.7 
To give more concrete content to emissions reductions targets, the parties 
to the FCCC in 1997 adopted the Kyoto Protocol8 (Protocol), an ancillary 
instrument to the Convention negotiated on behalf of the U.S. by the Clinton 
administration. Among other things, the Kyoto Protocol sets out commitments 
on the part of thirty-three industrialized nations, along with others that are 
making the transition to market economies, to reduce emissions of greenhouse 
gases by as much as eight percent from 1990 levels during a first commitment 
period covering the years 2008 to 2012. Although the substantive obligations 
have not yet been negotiated, the Kyoto Protocol anticipates additional 
reductions in subsequent commitment periods. 
Even before the Kyoto Protocol's adoption, the Senate had expressed its 
objection to the agreement in a resolution9 sponsored by Senators Byrd and 
Hagel and adopted by a vote of 95-0.10 The Clinton administration 
consequently had relatively little expectation of obtaining Senate advice and 
consent to ratification of the Protocol by the two-thirds majority required by 
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution.11 The executive branch nonetheless 
signed the Kyoto Protocol,12 presumably on the expectation that the 
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composition of the Senate in the future would shift in a direction more 
receptive to Kyoto. 
Even for countries that did not face the domestic impediments found in 
the United States, the framework of the Protocol required further elaboration 
before it could be ratified. Among the principal outstanding issues were the 
terms for implementing the agreement's novel “flexible mechanisms,” which 
were designed to reduce the cost of implementation by expanding the range of 
options available to states in fulfilling their obligations, principally in the form 
of trading emissions rights.13 The rules according to which the Protocol's 
flexible mechanisms were to be applied were controversial, and could be 
expected to have a major impact on both the efficacy of the agreement and the 
shape of international markets in emissions rights. 
 Accordingly, the parties to the Convention continued to work on the rules 
for implementing the Kyoto Protocol at their annual meetings, on the 
expectation that few if any states with substantive emissions reduction 
obligations under the agreement would ratify it until the terms of 
implementation were agreed. As of the end of the November 2000 annual 
meeting, held in the Hague while the outcome of the U.S. presidential election 
was still uncertain, agreement still had not been reached on decisions to 
implement the Kyoto Protocol. Consequently, parties to the Convention agreed 
to convene a resumed sixth session in Bonn, the seat of the Convention's 
Secretariat, in 2001. 
Meanwhile, in late March 2001, the prospects for progress on Kyoto rules 
darkened considerably when President Bush announced that the United States 
would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol.14 That same spring, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)15 released its Third Assessment Report. 
Contrary to the U.S. government's position, the report reinforced the 
seriousness of the global warming problem, concluding that “[t]he Earth’s 
climate system has demonstrably changed on both global and regional scales 
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 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, at art. 6. See generally David A. Wirth, The Sixth Session (Part 
Two) and Seventh Session of the Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate 
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 See Andrew C. Revkin, Bush’s Shift Could Doom Air Pact, Some Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2001, 
at A7. 
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 The IPCC, which met for the first time in November 1988, was created under the auspices of the 
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) with a 
mandate to study the climate change issue primarily from a scientific perspective. The IPCC's principal 
activities are divided among three working groups: a science working group addressing the causes of 
climate change, a working group studying social and environmental impacts of climate change, and a 
working group addressing response options for limiting greenhouse gas emissions and mitigating the effects 
of climate change. The IPCC's first and second assessment reports, released in 1990 and 1995, respectively, 
provided much of the scientific basis for the Convention and the Protocol. 
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since the pre-industrial era, with some of these changes attributable to human 
activities.”16  
Notwithstanding the IPCC's broad international composition, consensus-
based decision making process, and high degree of international respect, the 
Bush administration requested the U.S. National Academy of Sciences to 
review the Intergovernmental Panel’s work product. Instead of contradicting 
the IPCC’s conclusions, the National Academy reaffirmed them, thereby 
negating any inference that the panel's conclusions had been politically 
motivated.17 While the Bush administration could hardly deny the seriousness 
of the global warming problem after the National Academy’s report, the 
president nonetheless reiterated his opposition to the Kyoto Protocol—mere 
days after the report’s release. Labeling the Kyoto Protocol “fundamentally 
flawed,” the Bush administration's June 2001 critique of the agreement 
identified five themes familiar from earlier debates on the greenhouse issue, 
but which until that time had not prevented executive branch support for the 
Protocol.18 
The Bush decision sent shock waves through the negotiating process at a 
critical juncture, but ultimately did not derail adoption of the implementing 
rules, known as the Marrakesh Accords,19 in November 2002. As of this 
writing, 121 states have ratified the Protocol, more than twice as many as the 
minimum fifty-five ratifications needed as one of two conditions precedent for 
the Protocol to enter into force.20 The second condition requires ratifications 
from states representing fifty-five percent of 1990 global emissions of carbon 
dioxide; emissions from ratifying countries now represent 44.2 percent of that 
level.21 Despite the Russian Federation’s recent indications that it might revisit 
its intent to ratify, the likelihood of achieving the fifty-five percent cutoff in 
the near future is nonetheless reasonably high and contrary to the premature 
predictions of the death of the Protocol.  
Having completed its own review of the climate change issue, the White 
House in February 2002 released a new Clear Skies and Global Climate 
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Change Initiative. Instead of reducing emissions from a fixed baseline, as 
specified in the Kyoto Protocol, the Bush proposal would lower the intensity 
of greenhouse gases, defined as “the ratio of greenhouse gas emissions to 
economic output,” from today's 183 metric tons per million dollars of GDP to 
151 by 2012.22 The proposal includes such features as tax credits for 
investments in renewable energy, and progress is to be reassessed in 2012, the 
end of the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol.23 It is not yet 
clear whether this proposal could be meshed with the Kyoto approach, in 
particular because actual emissions are keyed to economic performance, a 
formula that may allow actual emissions to increase if economic activity is 
sufficiently vigorous. 
More or less simultaneously, the Bush administration declined to support 
the candidacy of Dr. Robert Watson, a U.S. national, for a subsequent term as 
chairman of the IPCC.24 To a storm of international controversy, Watson—one 
of the world’s leading climate scientists who had worked previously for the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, later in the Clinton White 
House, and is currently Chief Scientist and Director of the Environmentally 
and Socially Sustainable Development Network at the World Bank25—was 
replaced by Indian scientist Rajendra Pachauri, director general of a private 
research organization in New Delhi, India. 
The case history of the Kyoto Protocol demonstrates a number of 
important dynamic characteristics of international negotiations, principal 
among them the preeminent role of the president and the executive branch. 
Because of the president's constitutional prerogatives as “the sole organ of the 
nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign 
nations,”26 he is the principal domestic actor in crafting the international law 
of the environment, as in other areas, on behalf of the United States in 
multilateral processes. To that extent, his function is very different from the 
domestic arena, where we are accustomed to think of Congress as the principal 
law-giver and the executive branch, as the name suggests, as responsible 
primarily for implementation of the law as written by the legislature. Among 
other things, this structural attribute means that policy shifts in international 
settings can be much more rapid and dramatic than is likely to be the case in 
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Congress, which has multiple actors and a bicameral structure in which only a 
third of the upper chamber can be replaced over any two-year period due to 
staggered terms. As demonstrated by this example, the president has great 
discretion in exercising the authority of the United States not only in law-
making settings, such as the Marrakesh Accords, but also in the day-to-day 
conduct of multilateral interactions, as in the IPCC, with relatively little 
oversight from the other branches of the federal government. 
Ironically, the U.S. under the Clinton administration was a principal 
architect of the Kyoto trading scheme, which was designed in part to make the 
agreement more palatable to a skeptical Senate. Then, as the Senate grew 
somewhat more receptive to action on the climate issue, Kyoto was rejected by 
a new president, leaving the rest of the world to work through the minutiae of 
an agreement whose shape had been crafted largely by a state that no longer 
intended to become a party to the instrument. This demonstrates not only the 
dominant position of the president, but also the subordinate function of 
Congress in international affairs of all kinds, including those relating to the 
global environment. No matter how enthusiastic Congress might be about an 
international agreement, there is little that it can do to coerce an unwilling 
president into negotiating, signing, or ratifying such an agreement. The 
Senate's role is largely passive and negative, in the sense that the upper 
chamber cannot craft new obligations, but only accept or reject those that have 
been shaped by the president. The House of Representatives plays a lesser role 
still, although it is likely to have some say on statutory matters typically 
required to implement international agreements.  
 
III. INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
 
If the history of the Kyoto Protocol demonstrates the president's capacity 
to frustrate multilateral efforts to protect the environment, recent experience 
with trade agreements demonstrates the potential for the president to use 
international obligations to undermine environmental guarantees. As long ago 
as the early nineteenth century the British economist David Ricardo, 
responding to the prevalent mercantilist and colonialist views of the time, 
hypothesized that countries that reciprocally open their borders to foreign 
trade will inevitably be better off than countries that impede or prohibit trade. 
Ricardo observed that free trade encourages specialization and global 
economic efficiency, both of which benefit the public. The Ricardo theory of 
comparative advantage is alive and well today in modern trade agreements, 
including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),27 the 
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agreement creating the World Trade Organization (WTO),28 and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).29  
International agreements, of virtually all sorts, are characterized by a flow 
of rights and obligations. The obligations in international trade agreements—
including the GATT, WTO agreements, and NAFTA—are basically ones of 
nondiscrimination and are expressed legally in three principal ways. The first 
of the principal obligations or “disciplines” found in international trade 
agreements is the requirement for most favored nation (MFN) treatment. For 
countries that have MFN status with the United States, the U.S. has promised 
to not treat those countries’ goods differently than the goods of other MFN 
nations. So, if the U.S. is carrying on trade relations with the fictional 
countries of Fredonia and Ruritania, and both have MFN status, the U.S. is 
obliged to treat Ruritania no less well than it treats Fredonia, and vice versa. 
With respect to nationally produced goods, the second principal discipline—
the national treatment obligation—requires treatment of imported products no 
less well than similar, domestically manufactured products. So, for instance, if 
the United States imports widgets from Fredonia, it must treat the imported 
Fredonian widgets no less well than it treats the domestically manufactured 
widgets. The national treatment requirement, taken together with the MFN 
obligation, results in a kind of equal protection clause for goods in 
international trade. A third discipline, the prohibition on quantitative 
restrictions, can be thought of as a corollary to the national treatment 
obligation. If a country does not have restrictions on the quantity of a certain 
product that can be produced domestically, it cannot put quantitative 
restrictions on imported versions of that product. Collectively, these three 
nondiscrimination obligations operate something like the “dormant commerce 
clause” under the U.S. Constitution, which domestically restricts a state's 
capacity to regulate in ways that interferes with interstate trade within the 
United States. 
To understand the trade and environment dynamic, it helps to understand 
the structure of trade negotiations. Using Ruritania and Fredonia again as 
examples, assume both countries have trade barriers of whatever kind—tariffs, 
embargoes, regulations—that impede the free movement of goods between the 
two countries. Neither of them acting on its own is likely to lower those trade 
barriers. On the other hand, Ricardo tells us that if they get together and in a 
reciprocal way promise to reduce their trade barriers simultaneously, they will 
both be better off. Hence, the purpose of an international trade agreement—in 
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 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867  U.N.T.S. 155, 33 
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contrast to a unilateral action by either Fredonia or Ruritania—is to overcome 
“prisoners' dilemmas” that otherwise would inhibit action by either party. Each 
side is invited to agree reciprocally to reduce its trade barriers in return for a 
promise from the other side similarly to reduce its barriers. Large multilateral 
trade agreements, such as the WTO suite of agreements, are somewhat more 
complicated but in principle have a similar structure. 
The obligations in these reciprocal trade agreements are significant for a 
state's economic well-being. If Ruritania agrees to lower its trade barriers in 
return for similar promises from Fredonia, Fredonia has a legitimate 
expectation that Ruritania will perform on those obligations. That Ruritania 
might not do so demonstrates the need to craft effective means for settling 
disputes in some binding third party process like a court proceeding. 
What does all of this mean for the environment? One can usefully start 
from the perspective that international obligations on trade are almost 
exclusively “negative.” The term is not intended to be judgmental or 
pejorative, but descriptive. Trade obligations are negative in the same sense 
that the First Amendment is negative: to the extent that we have free speech in 
this country, it is because the government is disabled by the First Amendment 
from intruding into an otherwise free market of ideas. Similarly, trade 
agreements that encourage liberalized or free trade are defined by obligations 
that limit governmental intrusion into what otherwise would be a free market. 
It is this freedom from governmental interference that largely defines 
liberalization. Another word for this phenomenon might be deregulation—in 
the sense of reducing the level of governmental intrusion in the market—and 
trade agreements, by virtue of their negative obligations, are inherently 
deregulatory. This deregulatory momentum largely explains the phenomenon 
of globalization, at least as it has been defined for the past decade or so—
getting governments out of the business of impeding private interactions and 
transactions, thereby facilitating their global reach. 
By contrast, environmental protection anticipates affirmative 
governmental interventions in the marketplace to offset market failures. There 
in a nutshell is the clash between the two approaches: One operates to disable 
governmental action and the other depends on invigorating government. 
Obligations in trade agreements proscribe certain activities, whereas 
environmental statutes prescribe other governmental actions. The same is true 
of international environmental agreements: The Kyoto Protocol requires 
parties to intervene in their domestic jurisdictions, presumably in a regulatory 
manner, to accomplish certain concrete results in the form of prohibitions on 
private actions. By contrast, trade agreements, with a few exceptions not 
relevant here, contain no affirmative rule making authority. Unlike 
international trade agreements, in domestic legal systems there is normally 
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some affirmative governmental regulatory authority to offset the externalities 
created by market liberalization. 
An example of where the concepts of free trade and environmental 
regulation come into conflict is the EU's ban on hormone treated beef.30 The 
EU depicts the ban as a health and safety measure. The United States, on the 
other hand, insists the ban is a protectionist measure designed to ensure access 
by European beef producers to European markets and to keep out competition. 
The result is that free traders may identify a health and safety regulation as an 
impediment to trade, a "non-tariff barrier." Consequently, the negative 
obligations found in international trade agreements will always be pushing 
towards a relaxation of the rigor of domestic health, safety, and environmental 
measures. This has been described by some as a “race to the bottom.” 
 
IV. INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
 
From a constitutional perspective, the very phrase “international trade 
agreement” presents something of a conundrum. Our Constitution divides 
authority over international trade between Congress, on the one hand, and the 
president on the other. Under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, 
Congress, and only Congress, has the power to regulate international trade. So, 
Congress can put tariffs in place by legislation. It can prohibit the importation 
of foreign goods, put fees on them, or allow importation only under certain 
circumstances. But Congress does not have the power to negotiate with other 
states to overcome the prisoners’ dilemmas that characterize international 
trade. Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, on the other hand, gives the 
president the exclusive authority to conduct foreign relations and to make 
treaties. But as we have seen earlier, the president does not have the unilateral 
power to legislate. So, in the usual case, the president negotiates an 
international agreement, brings it home, and presents it to the Senate for its 
advice and consent to ratification by a two-thirds majority.  
From the point of view of international trade there are some difficulties 
with this approach. First, the Senate can tinker with an agreement brokered by 
the president and alter its terms through the ratification process. Given the 
content of most trade agreements, each is almost certain to contain some 
provisions that will negatively affect some domestic constituency. The whole 
point of trade agreements is to lower trade barriers for the benefit of the public 
as a whole, but industries and other constituencies that benefit from trade 
barriers are obviously going to object to their removal. The result is a high 
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 See EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Complaint by the U.S., Report 
of the Panel, WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18 1997), available at http:// 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_subjects_index_e.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2004). 
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likelihood that a trade agreement may be revisited in substantial part and 
subject to revision in the Senate. The second problem with this approach is 
that it leaves out the House of Representatives.  
To remedy this difficulty, the executive and legislative branches have 
crafted an innovation called a “congressional-executive agreement,” which is 
the form in which trade agreements have been adopted since 1974. Congress, 
exercising its Article I, Section 8 powers, authorizes the president, by prior 
statute, to negotiate an international trade agreement on general terms, 
provided that the agreement not enter into force until Congress adopts 
subsequent implementing legislation.31 The president carries out the 
negotiations, brings home an agreement, and then presents the agreement to 
Congress, along with implementing legislation that is typically drafted by the 
executive branch. 
The principal innovation in this scheme is that the subsequent 
implementing legislation is adopted on what was formerly called the “fast-
track,” which allows for no amendments and only limited public participation. 
More recently, this form of congressional authorization has been called, 
somewhat euphemistically, “trade promotion authority,” presumably to dispel 
some of the negative baggage associated with the term “fast-track.” Although 
most constitutional scholars believe that congressional-executive agreements 
are fully the equivalent of treaties that have gone through the Senate advice-
and-consent process, the agreements in fact provide Congress with a much 
smaller role. Under fast-track procedures, Congress has only one very 
unattractive remedy if it does not like an agreement, which is to disapprove it 
altogether. Congress has essentially forgone the normal domestic statutory 
processes, thereby substantially increasing the executive’s role in the law-
making function with respect to international trade. Moreover, in a case 
seeking compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act for the 
negotiation of NAFTA, the United States District Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia held that the judicial branch has no role in reviewing the 
fast-track trade agreement process.32 So, in addition to Congress’s reduced 
role, the courts are essentially cut out of the process, further enhancing 
presidential prerogative.  
Fast-track agreements also have impacts on the administrative process, 
which can significantly affect environmental interests. Under normal law-
making processes, Congress adopts a statute through public hearings, with 
published texts of bills and a variety of procedural guarantees designed to 
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 See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974 § 101, 19 U.S.C. § 2111 (2000) (authorizing negotiation of trade 
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insure the accountability and transparency of the legislative process. The 
enacted legislation usually includes a mandate to an agency, such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to elaborate the statutory 
requirements by adopting regulations. These regulations are promulgated by 
the agency with additional procedural guarantees, such as notice to the public, 
an opportunity for public comment, and the requirement that the agency 
respond to the comments. If an affected constituency is dissatisfied with the 
results of the administrative process, it can go to court and challenge the 
agency action through a judicial review proceeding, for which there will also 
be public hearings and publicly available briefs. 
The process of negotiating and implementing trade agreements is 
considerably less accountable and less transparent to the public. In terms of 
making the law in the first place, the international negotiating sessions that 
lead to an agreement are closed to the public. Non-governmental observers are 
not permitted, and interim drafts are not usually published. Similarly, the 
dispute settlement process (the analogue to judicial review) in most trade 
agreements is largely closed to the public. Although these proceedings have 
opened up somewhat in recent years, written submissions may not be publicly 
available in their entirety, there is no possibility for private party intervention, 
and only very limited opportunity to participate in a quasi-amicus curiae 
capacity. Moreover, most of the dispute settlement panel members are not 
experts on the kinds of scientific questions that come up in environmental 
cases. So, panel members frequently must refer issues to outside experts, and 
that process is also quite opaque. Further, the United States is represented as a 
litigant by the only part of the federal government with the power to conduct 
foreign policy, the executive branch, which might be overly accommodating in 
its litigation posture, particularly in the case of rules that it may not 
enthusiastically support.  
An example of one regulation that was challenged in this way is a rule 
promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency under the Clean Air Act 
dealing with reformulated gasoline. For gasoline to qualify as reformulated it 
must be compared to a baseline, unreformulated state. In its rule, EPA 
specified that domestic refiners could choose from a variety of baselines. 
Because there were fewer data about foreign refiners, making enforcement 
much more difficult, EPA did not give foreign refiners a choice, but instead 
assigned them a baseline. As a matter of trade law, this was a relatively easy 
case of facial discrimination, violating the basic GATT and WTO 
disciplines.33  
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 See Appellate Body Report, United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WT/DS2/AB/R, 35 I.L.M. 603 (May 20, 1996), available at http:// 
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The real issue, however, was what happened after the WTO dispute 
settlement panel report on the rule came out. As a matter of domestic 
U.S. law, dispute settlement panel reports have no domestic legal effect; 
to be implemented, the report had to go back to EPA for remedial action. 
The agency subsequently started a new rule making process by 
publishing a notice of proposed rule making, soliciting comments, and 
the like. The problem was that at the same time that the rule making was 
going on, another part of the executive branch, the U.S. Trade 
Representative, was reassuring the challenging party (Venezuela) that 
the new regulation would comply with the WTO panel’s report. This 
tended to attenuate, if not entirely undermine, the rights of public 
participation that we are accustomed to in the ordinary administrative 
process, and which have given domestic environmental law such vigor. 
Later, the amended rule was challenged by a coalition of domestic 
refiners and environmental organizations. Before it was challenged for 
violating international trade agreements, the original rule was an 
ordinary garden-variety regulation. Hence, if it had been challenged at 
that point, the court would have used ordinary domestic law as the 
standard for the judicial review process. The amended rule, however, 
was now an issue of foreign affairs because it was necessary for the 
United States to comply with its international obligations as determined 
by the WTO. This situation created a dilemma for the court: Applying 
the domestic statutory standards might compel the United States, by 
judicial order, to violate its international obligations. In the end, the D.C. 
Circuit sought to harmonize the international obligations with domestic 
law, and upheld the amended rule.34 Arguably, this tended to dilute 
normal domestic statutory law in favor of an international agreement 
that, as we have already seen, was drafted and applied, both 
internationally and domestically, through a process dominated by the 
executive. 
International trade agreements can present similar imbalances 
between the federal government and the states. An example is a 
Massachusetts statute that prohibited procurement by the state 
government of products from companies that do business in Myanmar 
(formerly Burma) out of concern over human rights violations by the 
regime there. This was not a regulatory statute. The government of 
Massachusetts was not prohibiting private parties from doing anything; 
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rather, the state merely chose not to purchase on its own behalf from 
companies that do business in Myanmar. Although the statute was 
successfully challenged on domestic legal grounds,35 there were also 
potential international trade problems because the legislation arguably 
discriminated between those companies doing business in Myanmar and 
those operating in every other country on the planet. The statute, as a 
result, would quite possibly have fallen under the purview of the WTO 
Agreement on Government Procurement.36 Although this case never 
reached that stage, it illustrates how trade agreements negotiated by the 
executive and adopted on the fast track could tie the hands of the 
states.37  
 
V. CONCLUSION: PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
DIPLOMACY 
 
The defects and limitations, both legal and policy, in the process of 
crafting international agreements are perhaps most obvious in the field of 
international trade. To remedy these imbalances, one might implement three 
specific changes. First, abandon fast-track processes, or, at the very least, open 
the negotiations for trade agreements and the debates over implementing 
legislation to the public. Second, specify that adverse dispute settlement panel 
reports have no effect on statutory mandates, are entitled to no deference in 
court proceedings, have no effect in domestic, administrative, or judicial 
proceedings, and have no preemptive effect on state law. 
 Although this latter suggestion might appear to be advocating violation of 
international law, that is not the case. We live in a federal system with a 
federal government characterized by a separation of powers. For example, in 
the case of a state law that violates a trade agreement, the federal government 
can always negotiate with the state, and if that fails Congress can enact a 
special statute that supersedes the state law in question. The current system 
leaves virtually all that power to the executive, which has the capacity to bring 
a judicial action against a state to assure compliance. Similarly, in the case of 
an administrative regulation required by a regulatory statute that contravenes a 
trade agreement, Congress can always amend the statutory mandate. For the 
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courts to artificially craft a newfound kind of deference to the executive in 
such circumstances simply risks distorting the delicate balance in our domestic 
regulatory regime. 
None of this is to say, however, that the exercise of presidential power in 
foreign relations more generally ought necessarily to be constrained. The use 
of international agreements in the fields of both the environment and 
international trade is a long-standing technique that can overcome domestic, 
political, and, sometimes, legal constraints. That is generally for the good. 
Unfortunately, while the president has assembled greater power to act on trade 
issues, that power has rarely, if ever, been applied with the same sort of zeal to 
environmental matters. Instead, we have what might be called ordinary 
environmental diplomacy, where we end up with watered-down agreements 
that tend to languish in the Senate. In fact, to the extent that creative thinking 
has happened in foreign relations, it has tended to operate to the detriment of 
the environment, as in the trade area. It is not at all clear that there is a legal 
remedy to this essentially political problem. All presidents are jealous of the 
prerogatives of the office—mild-mannered souls like Jimmy Carter just as 
much as the more rugged type personified by Ronald Reagan. While the 
principles of presidential power are content-neutral, it is fair to say that we 
have yet to see a president who even begins to exhaust their potential for 
creative use in international diplomacy for the benefit of the environment. 
 
